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SUMMARY
The historical formation of holm oak (Quercus ilex L.) dehesa woodlands has often resulted in either rapid
deforestation episodes by means of clear cuts or slower depletion of oak woodlands due to tree natural mortality
and the absence of tree natural regeneration. Consequently, holm oak woodlands have been progressively con-
verted into rough pasturelands, cereal croplands and scrublands. Whilst this tendency of holm oak exhaustion
was not socially questioned, scientists and conservationists defending oak woodland conservation providing
long run economic and environmental arguments were regarded as romantics ignoring the necessity for social
progress and development. Today, these romantics are perceived as nature conservation pioneers and many of
their arguments and concepts have been included in science and politics. This paper shows that cereal cropping
and permanent grassland uses are more profitable to Extremadura’s landowners than holm oak artificial planta-
tions and monitored holm oak natural regeneration. Increasing social demand for recreational and conservation
services have been taken into account by Spanish and European public authorities. Along last decade, the Euro-
pean Union and the Spanish government have financed oak reforestation over extensive-use croplands of West
and Southwest Spain, resulting in an unprecedented net increase in holm oak woodlands. The presented ex-
tended cost-benefit analysis shows that even after incorporating estimated income derived from public and pri-
vate consumption of environmental services, uses associated to treeless cropland, pastureland and scrubland are
still preferred to traditional extensive multiple use associated to dehesa holm oak woodlands.
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INTRODUCTION
Why dehesa owners have preferred pulling out of holm oak in favour to cropland and
pastureland conversion?, why during the 1970s first half public administration subsidised
these land use changes?, why current dehesa owners let holm oak woodlands disappear
instead of carrying out monitored natural regeneration programs in which grazing is tem-
porally prevented?, and why European and Spanish public administration have carried out
holm oak reforestation programs along 1990s second half?
The aim of this paper is to provide some answers to these four questions from the
economic perspective. Present discounted values (PDV) and internal rates of returns
(IRT) associated in one hand to cereal cropping and ageing holm oak woodlands and in
the other to artificial plantations and monitored natural tree regeneration of holm oaks are
calculated and respectively compared.
Annual income (see Table 1) associated to cereal rotations correspond to steady state
values calculated at 1998 market prices as described in Campos et al. (2001).
Holm oak reforestation and natural regeneration economic analysis have required pre-
vious prescription of a normative silviculture and associated physical production
(Montero et al., 2000). Holm oak growth and crown projection ratios were measured and
estimated from field data. Acorn production function was calculated using available data
in Vázquez et al. (1999).
Three finite time horizons are considered and thus holm oak woodland price func-
tions must be determined. Woodland prices are supposed to depend on stand age (see Fig-
ure 1). Land prices associated to treeless land are supposed constant and equal to 1998
market prices.
Private and social holm oak woodland management is analysed. For this purpose, pri-
vate landowners and society are supposed to maximise private capital income at factor
costs (PCIfc) and social capital income at market prices (SCImp) respectively.
Private dehesa landowners often have positive values of annual environmental ser-
vice self-consumption, partially motivated by their right to prevent access to visitors. In
other words, landowners who declare to have positive levels of environmental service
self-consumption, in the form of recreational and habitat conservation services, are will-
ing to give up some of their capital income before they feel obliged to sell their dehesa es-
tates. The market for land must then record landowners preferences and hence, selling
prices will include the capital value 1 of controlled environmental services.
Income associated to uncontrolled consumption of environmental services, i.e. those
services consumed by free access visitors along dehesa pathways, is estimated by means
of determining visitors’ willingness to pay. For this purpose, a market scenario in which
visitors’ monetary contribution is crucial for conservation and maintenance of the natural
area is simulated.
Additionally, acorns are supposed to be partially consumed by wild fauna. Associated
economic opportunity cost is thus calculated.
Society is believed to pursue maximum possible levels of commercial benefits at
market prices as well as environmental ones from dehesa management. Society’s interest
110 D. MARTÍN et al.
1 Capital value is computed as the infinite horizon present discounted value of an economic flow associ-
ated to a given land use (see Campos et al., 2001: Chapter 4; Martín, 2001).
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on holm oak woodland conservation is uncertain since no monitored 2 tree natural regen-
eration scheme has taken place over ageing woodlands.
The extended cost benefit analysis carried out in this paper includes (i) commercial
income, (ii) income associated to environmental service consumption by landowners
(self-consumption) and free access visitors, and (iii) income associated to wild fauna
acorn consumption. Precisely, the inclusion of these last two income sources gives the ex-
tended feature to this cost benefit analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Time horizons
Finite time horizon analysis requires consideration of land residual values. Through-
out the analysis, land value enters capital income functions negatively at the beginning of
the period (t = 0), and positively and correspondingly discounted at the end of the time
horizon (t = T). A continuous function for the price of holm oak woodland depending on
stand age has been estimated as follows. The infinite horizon present discounted value of
private capital income at market prices (PCImp) associated to an artificial plantation of
holm oak with no tree natural regeneration at the end of the silvicultural cycle and transi-
tion to treeless cropland is calculated for different discount rates and all tree ages. By
comparing obtained capital values with available market prices for adult holm oak wood-
lands and cereal croplands, the implicit discount rate is obtained 3. The continuous func-
tion for holm oak woodland prices is consequently estimated by fitting a polynomial func-
tion to the capital value function evaluated at the resulting implicit discount rate 4 (see
Figure 1).
Three different time horizons are considered:
(i) 20 years time horizon. After 20 years to plantation subsidies for income compen-
sation are not longer given to landowners engaged into reforestation or natural re-
generation 5 schemes. Additionally, grazing is not longer restricted.
(ii) 52/54 years time horizon. Acorn production of holm oak plantations or natural re-
generation stands attains representative levels at the age of 52 and 54 respec-
tively.
(iii) 141/143 years time horizon. At this age, tree density is quite low and conse-
quently acorn production decreases. Conversely, surface grazing resources be-
come more important.
112 D. MARTÍN et al.
2 See Montero et al. (2000) for full details on holm oak natural regeneration silvicultural cycles.
3 The implicit discount rate minimises the distance between prices calculated as capital values and ob-
served market prices.
4 Implicit discount rates are in this case between 2.5 and 3.5 %.
5 Although monitored natural regeneration has not actually taken place along European Union (EU) refor-
estation programs, authors have simulated natural regeneration scenarios as described in Montero et al. (2000).
Subsidies are supposed to be similar to the ones actually offered for artificial plantations, apart from mainte-
nance subsidies perceived along first five years to plantation, which are assumed to be zero in the case of tree
natural regeneration.
Costs and revenues
Commercial and environmental revenues
Revenues are valued at 1998 market prices and do not include subsidies net of taxes
on products. When market transactions do not take place, as in the case of private and so-
cial consumption of environmental services, market scenarios are appropriately simulated.
Acorns. Holm oak acorn production is estimated for all different tree age classes tak-
ing into account vecería effects. 60 % of total acorn production is supposed to be con-
sumed by pigs in montanera (feed units (FU) are paid twice as much when acorns are
used by pigs rather than alternative livestock species). The remaining 40 % is assumed to
be consumed by wild fauna.
Pasture. Pasture production over holm oak woodlands is supposed to depend on
crown projection ratio. Cereal cropping has also some pasture production due to rotational
management.
Firewood. Silvicultural treatments such as cuts, thinnings, and regeneration cuts pro-
duce firewood.
Cereal income. Private and social capital income at market prices and factor costs are
estimated. Dehesa owner is supposed to rent this type of land use.
Game income. Little game is assumed to take place over holm oak dehesa estates.
These services are also hired out to a local hunting society.
Income from controlled environmental services. A contingent valuation survey car-
ried out in Monfragüe Shire shows that dehesa owners are willing to trade off lower in-
come returns for environmental service self-consumption assurance. A conservative value
Invest. Agr.: Sist. Recur. For.: Fuera de Serie n.º 1-2001
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Fig. 1.–Holm oak woodland price function estimation. Prices are expressed as a function of tree
age. Prices are given in 1998 pesetas per hectare (pta/ha)
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is accepted as a market proxy for the value of environmental service consumption, in par-
ticular, half the median of the obtained distribution for visitors’ willingness to pay. As a
result, environmental service self-consumption in the form of recreation and habitat con-
servation is estimated (Mariscal and Campos, 2000).
Income from uncontrolled environmental services. Free access visitors’ willingness to
pay is also estimated by means of a contingent valuation survey carried out in Monfragüe.
In this case, the median was taken as the market proxy for entrance fees. Consumption of
environmental services includes recreation and habitat conservation services (Campos,
1998).
Subsidies net of taxes on products. Subsidies for cereal cropping are taken from Na-
tional Agricultural Accounts (MAPA, 1999). In the case of holm oak reforestation, subsi-
dies correspond to those actually given in Extremadura through application of ECC Coun-
cil Regulation 2080/92 (Comisión Europea, 1992; Consejería de Agricultura y Comercio
y Dirección General de Estructuras Agrarias de la Junta de Extremadura, pers. comm.,
1999 and 2001). Taxes correspond to 1998 agricultural general tax regime. Public admin-
istration expenditure on fire protection, service provision to visitors, and guarding, are in-
cluded and accounted as implicit subsidies.
Commercial costs
National accounts criteria (Eurostat, 1996) and its pilot application to forests
(Eurostat, 2000) are used for costs estimation. Environmental costs have not been mea-
sured in this study.
Intermediate consumption. Public administration direct expenditure is assumed to
have positive effects over described commercial revenues and hence must be included as
intermediate consumption. Public administration investments are nonetheless excluded.
Hired services for silvicultural treatment works constitute the only additional entry to in-
termediate consumption, as other activities are directly hired out by landowners and
hence, imply no intermediate costs to landowners. Associated labour costs are obviously
excluded from intermediate consumption calculation. Intermediate consumption is mea-
sured at market prices and hence, do not include subsidies net of taxes on products.
Labour costs. They include all labour costs directly generated in cereal croplands,
holm oak reforestations and natural regeneration stands.
Fixed capital consumption. The unique considered fixed capital consumption corre-
sponds to fencing costs, due to 20 year grazing restriction over artificial plantations and
natural regeneration stands. Residual value associated to fencing is assumed to be zero in
all analysed time periods.
Determination of time discount rate
An implicit discount rate is obtained by comparing capital values of PCImp associ-
ated to cereal croplands and ageing holm oak woodlands with corresponding observed
market prices. In this case, under 1998 market conditions and prescribed holm oak
selviculture, the discount rate that makes capital values closer to observed market prices
corresponds to 2.5 %. This discount rate is assumed equal to all land uses within dehesa
estates.
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Annual capital income variables
Private capital income at market prices
Private total revenue (TR) includes all mentioned revenues except uncontrolled envi-
ronmental service consumption (ESCu) and wild fauna acorn consumption (WFAC). Pri-
vate total costs (TC) include all described costs except public administration intermediate
costs (PAIC). Private capital gains (PCG) are not annually 6 considered when calculating
private capital income at market prices (PCImp) and hence, PCImp value is equivalent to
private net operating income (PNOI):
PCImp = PNOI = TR – (ESCu + WFAC) – (TC – PAIC)
Private capital income at factor costs
Private capital income at factor costs (PCIfc) is assumed to be the variable taken into
account by landowners when making decisions.
In this case, PCIfc is equal to private net operating surplus (PNOS) and it is simply
the value of PCImp plus subsidies net of taxes on products (SNT):
PCIfc = PNOS = PCImp + SNT = PNOM + SNT
Social capital income
Social capital income (SCI) is estimated at real and imputed market prices, without
subsidies net of taxes on products. As social capital gains (SCG) have not been intro-
duced, SCI is equivalent to net operating margin (NOM). This last variable is calculated
by adding to PNOM, uncontrolled environmental service consumption (ESCu) and wild
fauna acorn consumption (WFAC). Precisely, the sum of ESCu and WFAC constitutes
uncontrolled environmental net operating margin (ENOMu):
SCI = NOM = PNOM + ESCu + WFAC = PNOS + ENOMu
Present discounted values
The aim of this section is to provide the mathematical expressions for finite horizon
present discounted value calculation. Values have to be calculated for all the proposed
time horizons and land uses. For more detailed analysis on finite and infinite horizon
present discounted values refer to Campos et al. (2001): Chapter 4.
Invest. Agr.: Sist. Recur. For.: Fuera de Serie n.º 1-2001
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6 Alternatively, capital gains are considered by land residual value function, calculated as the difference be-
tween the present discounted value of land price at time T and the value of land at time t = 0, i.e.  T f (T) – f (0).
Cereal cropland rotations, pasturelands and scrublands
Steady state annual income variables associated to treeless land uses are denoted by
 i, where i denotes land use: annual cereal cropping (i = 1), cereal-grass rotations (i = 2),
pasturelands (i = 3), and scrublands (i = 4). Present discounted values for each time hori-
zon and land use are calculated as follows:
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Where p i
land represents market price for land with use i, and  is discount function (1 /
(1 + r)), r is annual discount rate.
Ageing holm oak woodlands without tree natural regeneration
Holm oak woodlands aged 250 years and not entering the monitored natural regenera-
tion program are evaluated along following 20, 54, and 143 years. Annual income vari-
ables are denoted as follows:
y (t) =
t = 250 y (250) = y (250)– f
nnr(finite)
nnr(finite) nnr (250)
t = T y (T) = y (T)+ f(T) T = 270,304
t 250
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 ; T y (t) = y (t)nnr(finite) nnr





[2]
Where f (t) is estimated continuous function for holm oak woodland prices, and rep-
resents land value when stand age is t. Present discounted values for first two time hori-
zons are calculated by the following expressions:
V = y (t) T = 27nnr(250)(finite)
t=250
T
nnr(finite)
t–250

0,304 [3]
Alternatively, when time horizon is above 70 years, ageing woodlands are supposed
to become treeless croplands, pasturelands or even scrublands. For transition to treeless
land use i, present discounted value for last time horizon (T = 143) is given by:
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Artificial plantation and monitored tree natural regeneration
Annual income variables associated to artificial plantations or natural regeneration
stands are denoted by expressions [5] and [6] respectively:
y (t) =
t = 0 y (0) = y (0)– p
t = T ya(finite)
a(finite) a i
land
a a(finite) a a a a a
a a(fin
(T ) = y (T )+ f(T ); T 20;52;141
t T y

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[5]
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Associated present discounted value expressions are consequently:
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RESULTS
Holm oak reforestation and cereal-grass rotations
The market
Present discounted values (PDVs) of PCImp are negative for all considered time hori-
zons in the case of holm oak reforestation through artificial plantations. Conversely, cor-
responding values for cereal-grass rotations are positive. PDVs at market prices get larger
in both cases as time horizon increases, nonetheless increases are larger in the case of ce-
real-grass rotations. Hence, incurred loss in PDV due to land use change to holm oak
woodland increases also with time horizon (Table 2).
Internal rates of return (IRR) evolve in a different manner. Whilst in the case of holm
oak artificial plantations IRR increase with time horizon (+2.36 from T = 20 to T = 141),
the ones associated to cereal-grass rotations decrease with time horizon (–.14 from T = 20
to T = 141). Losses in IRR values due to land use change from cropland to holm oak
woodland decrease as time horizon increases, and are improved in 2.5 points (see Ta-
ble 3).
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The landowner
Both cereal cropping and holm oak reforestations are currently subsidised by public
administration since application of ECC Council Regulation 2080/92.
Present discounted values of PCIfc associated to holm oak artificial plantations are
larger than those associated to cereal-grass rotations in all analysed time horizons. For
longest time horizon, present discounted values are above land market prices in both
cases. Gain associated to land use change from croplands to woodlands decreases with
time horizon, going from a maximum of 280,667 pesetas per hectare (pta/ha) (T = 20) to a
minimum of 190,689 pta/ha (T = 141) (see Table 2).
Internal rates of return of PCIfc associated to holm oak reforestation are more than
double those of cereal-grass rotations. Largest gain due to land use change takes place for
lowest time horizon and equals 9.38 (Table 3).
Society
Present discounted values of social capital income (SCI) are higher in cereal-grass ro-
tations than in reforested woodlands. Losses induced by land use change from croplands
to woodlands attain maximum value for T = 141 and amounts to –379,254 pta/ha (Ta-
ble 2).
Conversely, loss in IRR value from land use change is minimum for T = 141 and at-
tains –2.68 points (Table 3).
Holm oak monitored natural regeneration and no natural regeneration stands
The market
Present discounted values of PCImp associated to holm oak monitored natural regen-
eration and ageing holm oak stands with no natural regeneration are negative for all con-
sidered time horizons. Comparing both cases, no natural regeneration provides higher in-
come values. Monitored natural regeneration incurs in additional losses that attain a maxi-
mum of –147,710 pta/ha when T = 143 (Table 2).
When analysing IRR, maximum loss due to implementation of holm oak monitored
natural regeneration instead of leaving the woodland age and disappear occurs when time
horizon is shortest (T = 20), attaining a loss of –1.16. Losses decrease with time horizon
down to –.37 when T = 143 (Table 3).
The landowner
Present discounted value of PCIfc is higher in all considered time horizons for holm
oak monitored natural regeneration stands than for ageing ones with no natural regenera-
tion. Gain due to monitored natural regeneration decreases with time horizon and has a
maximum value when T = 20 of 239,062 pta/ha (Table 2).
In terms of IRR of PCIfc, gains due to engagement in natural regeneration programs
decrease with time horizon from 3.21 when T = 20 to 1.24 when T = 143 (Table 3).
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Society
The PDV of SCI is lower for monitored natural regeneration stands than for ageing
ones independently of considered time horizons. For a time horizon of 20 years, PDV loss
amounts to –128,990 pta/ha, whilst IRR one is of –1.35 points (Tables 2 and 3).
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section evaluates relevant land use options under current market conditions and
public intervention scenario. On one side, cereal-grass rotations are evaluated against
holm oak artificial plantations. Additionally, the option of holm oak monitored natural re-
generation is compared with actual silvicultural practice of natural regeneration absence.
Holm oak artificial plantations and cereal-grass rotations: a comparison
Current ageing holm oak woodlands are gradually and generally converted into tree-
less natural pasturelands due to natural regeneration absence. Additionally, pasturelands
constitute most popular treeless land use along dehesas from West and Southwest Spain
(Díaz, Campos y Pulido, 1997). Cereal-grass rotations are often aimed to maintain pasture
productivity in dehesas. In economic terms, annual income at market prices is higher for
pasturelands than for cereal-grass rotations. Nonetheless, when subsidies are introduced,
annual income levels at factor cost are higher for cereal-grass rotations than for
pasturelands (Table 1).
Present extended cost-benefit analysis results show that at market prices, over soils
whose fertility could not admit higher land use intensity than that associated to ce-
real-grass rotation, management leading to pasture maintenance or improvement through
cereal-grass rotations rather than holm oak artificial plantation is rational in economic
terms. When analysing annual income results, steady state holm oak woodlands offer
lower annual private (at market prices) and social income levels than cereal-grass rota-
tions and pasturelands (Table 1).
At market prices, i.e. without subsidies net of taxes on products, the option of ce-
real-grass rotations is preferred to holm oak reforestations by both private and social
agents and under all analysed time horizons. Society’s preference for cereal-grass rota-
tions rather than holm oak reforestations is consistent with historical dehesa social man-
agement until application of ECC Council Regulation 2080/92. This fact can be regarded
as a contradiction, in one side social capital income is lower for woodland use than for ce-
real-grass rotations, and in the other, public administration expends large funds on holm
oak reforestation. Either actual subsidies to holm oak reforestations are too high or au-
thor’s estimation of social capital income is undervalued, most probably, a combination
of the two explains it best.
When looking at income values at factor costs, i.e. including subsidies net of taxes on
products, PDVs associated to holm oak artificial plantations are much higher than those
of cereal-grass rotations. In terms of IRR, gains due to reforestation are between 7.67 and
9.38. These two facts may show slight over compensation to private landowners entering
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reforestation schemes. It could be that landowners would be willing to increase reforesta-
tion area accepting current income (at factor cost) levels (Table 3).
Social capital income estimation may be under valued due to the absence of income
estimations associated to net carbon abatement and soil erosion reduction. Net income
contribution associated to omitted environmental services is nonetheless uncertain. For in-
stance, land use change from cereal-grass rotations or pasturelands into oak woodlands
may have positive or negative externalities over water services.
Holm oak monitored natural regeneration stands and ageing holm oak woodlands:
a comparison
In the absence of subsidies net of taxes on products, private managers would let holm
oak woodlands age and consequently disappear. This tendency towards ageing holm oak
woodlands appears to be true also for social agents. In fact, ECC Council Regulation
2080/92 does not include monitored natural regeneration programs in its reforestation
subsidy schemes. Present discounted value distances associated to monitored natural re-
generation stands and ageing ones are shorter than in the case of reforestations and ce-
real-grass rotations. Thus public expenditure on maintenance and improvement of holm
oak woodlands could be lower if monitored tree natural regeneration programs were in-
troduced in public administration subsidising schemes (Tables 2 and 3).
Current subsidies to holm oak artificial plantations have been more than enough to
offset land use change into woodlands along the 1995-1999 period. Subsidising scheme
for monitored holm oak natural regenerations is designed ad hoc. As already mentioned,
there is no application in reality of natural regeneration schemes. Hence, resulting private
preferences cannot be contrasted with observed private management. Present results show
that when looking at PDVs of private capital income at factor costs, natural regeneration
stands provide higher levels than ageing holm oak stands (Table 2).
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout presented extended cost-benefit analysis, it is assumed that the number of
hectares reforested are not enough to change current provision of environmental services
in the form of recreation and habitat conservation. The only additional accounted environ-
mental service is future wild fauna acorn consumption associated to reforestations.
Social and private agents’ behaviour with respect to holm oak woodland conservation
may appear myopic. Holm oak woodlands provision could decrease down in the future
and hence associated environmental services. Consequently, holm oak woodlands eco-
nomic value will be higher due to the scarcity factor. If social agents were discounting fu-
ture environmental income at higher discount rates than the ones considered in this study,
actual subsidies to holm oak reforestation would be well above appropriate levels.
Economic analysis has traditionally treated new complex issues in the simplest possi-
ble manner (Heal, 1998). Economic valuation of dehesa multiple use with the inclusion of
environmental services has only recently started (Campos et al., 2001). The use of a
unique discount rate may under value natural regeneration and reforestation scenarios.
122 D. MARTÍN et al.
Nonetheless, the lack of both, new studies with decreasing discount rates in tree age and
actual market transactions records for dehesa assets encourage the application of a unique
implicit discount rate.
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RESUMEN
Análisis coste-beneficio ampliado del uso múltiple de una tierra como encinar
adehesado y cultivo de cereal al tercio
La formación histórica del encinar adehesado ha conducido bruscamente –mediante
la repentina tala de la encina– o lentamente –por su muerte natural y ausencia de
regeneración– a la disminución continuada de la población de encinas en favor del cultivo
agrícola, el pastizal y el matorral. Mientras esta tendencia de desaparición de las encinas
no era cuestionada socialmente, la defensa de la encina con argumentos económicos y
ambientales de largo plazo por parte de algunos científicos y conservacionistas era vista
por la corriente mayoritaria de los técnicos de la agronomía como una posición
impregnada de romanticismo que ignoraba la necesidad del progreso social. Hoy los
románticos del encinar de ayer son percibidos como pioneros de la conservación de la
naturaleza, y muchos de sus argumentos y conceptos han sido incorporados a los
programas docentes y políticos. En este artículo se desarrolla la tesis de que en
Extremadura el uso de una tierra agrícola marginal como cultivo al tercio o pastizal
permanente le es más rentable al propietario que las opciones de plantar encinas y
regenerar el encinar envejecido con sus propios recursos económicos. Las crecientes
demandas sociales de disfrute recreativo y en defensa de la conservación del encinar se
han integrado en las cuestiones ambientales incorporadas a las agendas de los gobiernos
español y europeo. En la última década la Unión Europea y el Gobierno español han
financiado la reforestación con arbolado de quercíneas en las tierras de cultivo extensivo
de las dehesas del oeste y sudoeste español, y por primera vez en la historia de la gestión
de la dehesa, se va a producir una notable expansión del encinar, en el caso de que las
superficies repobladas lleguen a su madurez. El análisis coste-beneficio ampliado
comparado sobre los valores presentes descontados de las rentas privada y social,
originadas en las tierras no-aptas para el cultivo anual, prueban que la incorporación a las
rentas comerciales del encinar adehesado de las rentas estimadas de los servicios
ambientales consumidos por el publico y auto-consumidos por los propietarios no son
suficientes para mantener y expandir el uso múltiple de la tierra como encinar adehesado,
persistiendo la tendencia histórica de evolución del encinar adehesado hacia el cultivo
extensivo desarbolado, el pastizal permanente y el matorral, esta secuencia es la que
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prefieren los propietarios privados y públicos, y la que seguramente se produce cuando
gestionan sus encinares en ausencia de subvenciones al mantenimiento y expansión de las
encinas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Análisis coste-benefico ampliado
Reforestación de encinas
Regeneración natural de encinas
Rotación al tercio cereal-pasto
Dehesa arbolada
Renta comercial
Renta ambiental
Subvenciones públicas
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